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Abstract
The adoption decision for durable goods is intertemporal by definition. However, estimating
utility and discount functions from revealed preference data using dynamic discrete choice
models is difficult because of an inherent identification problem. To overcome this issue, we use
stated preference data. Specifically, we employ the experimental design of Dubé, Hitsch, and
Jindal (2014), where future prices are known and that elicits intertemporal adoption decisions
for Bluetooth speakers in a discrete choice framework. We estimate several models of discount-
ing (e.g., static, myopic, geometric, and quasi-hyperbolic) and find considerably lower discount
factors than typical market interest rates would suggest. The values are also smaller compared
to respondents’ matching-based discount factors, even though the correlation is positive and
significant. Furthermore, there are substantial differences in discounting across respondents
(i.e., heterogeneity in time-preferences) and lastly, there is no strong empirical evidence for
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Thus, the standard economic model seems to be appropriate for
the data at hand.
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1 Introduction
Understanding the adoption decision for a durable good is of great importance in quantitative
marketing and economics (Nair, 2007; Gowrisankaran and Ryzman, 2012; Melnikov, 2013).
Adopting a new product is a dynamic decision problem because deciding if and when to adopt
depends on (static) preferences for the product, the discounted future utility flow, and expec-
tations about future market conditions. Dynamic discrete choice models are well suited for
studying such adoption decisions, but they suffer from a fundamental identification problem
if estimated from market (i.e., revealed preference) data (Magnac and Thesmar, 2002), where
utility functions, discount factors, and subjective beliefs about future market conditions are
(typically) not jointly identified. As a simple solution, researchers often fix the discount fac-
tor in the estimation at a “reasonable value” (Gowrisankaran and Ryzman, 2012). Recently,
Dubé, Hitsch, and Jindal (2014; henceforth DHJ) presented a new approach for jointly estimat-
ing discount and utility functions from stated choice data. The authors propose a novel design
for a discrete choice experiment, where future prices of products are given (i.e., no uncertainty
about future market conditions). In several choice scenarios, respondents state (given current
and future prices) if they would adopt a new durable good and, if so, when and which particular
alternative they would choose. This information enables the joint identification of discount and
utility functions.
We apply the approach of DHJ and analyze the adoption decisions for portable Bluetooth
speakers over the next three years. The experimental design also allows for a model-free within-
subject analysis of the intertemporal adoption decisions. We estimate several discounting mod-
els (e.g., static, myopic, geometric, and (quasi-)hyperbolic) and test whether consumers are
forward-looking and, if so, how they value the future. Given limited empirical results on in-
tertemporal preferences in the context of durable good adoption decisions, our effort here can
be viewed as a conceptual replication of DHJ. Analyzing a different product category with data
from a different sample, we aim at a better understanding of how consumer value time. Fur-
thermore, we also measure discount factors using matching-tasks, where the same respondents
were told to imagine that they had won money and could get it now or later, and they had to
state how much (more) money they would like to receive to wait for one, two, or three years
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(Thaler, 1981). This enables us to study differences in discount factors across methods (and
respondents) to further improve our understanding about the novel approach proposed by DHJ
to elicit intertemporal preferences.
Our results show that consumers are indeed forward-looking, that models with discounting
fit the data better than static discrete choice models or models assuming myopic consumers,
but that discount factors are considerably lower (on average 0.43) than typical market interest
rates would suggest. The estimated discount factors are also lower compared to respondents’
matching-based discount factors for comparable monetary values and time frames, but the cor-
relation is positive and statistically significant, which speaks for the validity of the approach of
DHJ. As in DHJ, we also find substantial differences in discounting across respondents (i.e.,
heterogeneity in time-preferences), and this means that models using a homogeneous discount
factor might lead to biased results and false implications. Lastly, we do not find strong empirical
evidence for quasi-hyperbolic discounting and, therefore, the standard economic model seems
to be appropriate for the data at hand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we briefly present the
discrete choice models and the different discount functions we employ in our empirical study.
The setup for our empirical study is discussed in section 3. In section 4, we summarize the
estimation results for multiple models and compare the estimated discount factors with the
matching-based discount factors. We conclude in section 5 with a summary of our key findings
and an outlook on future research avenues.
2 Model
The model in our analysis captures the inherently dynamic choice problem that consumers face
when making adoption decisions for durable goods. That is, consumers interested in the product
category have to decide whether they want to adopt the product now or later. Adopting now has
immediate benefits (i.e., being able to use the product), but waiting might be beneficial if prices
will be lower in the future, which is a reasonable assumption for many durable goods categories
(e.g., consumer electronics).
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2.1 Discrete Choice Model
Assuming price predictions for all brands j = 1, . . . ,J to be known to all decision makers (i.e.,
respondents) i = 1, . . . , I simplifies the problem considerably (see DHJ for more details): For
each choice task c = 1, . . . ,C, respondent i can either state that she adopts brand j in period
t ≤ T (yi = ( j, t)), or not (yi = 0).
We start with a simple linear additive utility function:
ui jt = γi j+κi · price jt , (1)
where γi j are intercepts for each brand j and κ is the price coefficient. All parameters are
respondent-specific. The value in t = 0 from adopting the brand j in t is:
ωi jt = fi(t) · (γi j+κi · price jt). (2)
The discount function fi(t) maps the net utility ui jt from the adoption decision at time t to
the time when the choice experiment takes place (t = 0). Adding an i.i.d. type I extreme
value distributed error term εi jt to ωi jt leads to a simple multinomial logit model with J ·T +1
alternatives, where the probability of adopting brand j in t is:
Pr(yi = ( j, t)|price jt ,θi) = exp(ωi jt)
1+∑Tt ′ ∑
J
j′ exp(ωit ′ j′)
. (3)
with θi = [γi1, ...,γiJ,κi,δi]′ ∼MVN(θ¯ ,Σ).
2.2 Discount Functions
Several discount functions fi(t) have been proposed in the literature (Urminsky and Zauber-
man, 2016). The standard economic model assumes geometric discounting (Samuelson, 1937):
fGi (t) = δ
t
i . In this model the instantaneous discount rate, which is defined as − f ′i (t)/ fi(t), is
− log(δ ) and hence constant. The model further nests two important special cases: The static
model, where δi = 1 and the myopic model with δi = 0. In the former case, consumers do not
discount the future at all and are infinitely patient. In the latter case, consumers discount the
future as extreme as possible and obtain no utility from the adoption in t > 0.
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The hyperbolic model of Mazur (1987), with fHi (t) = 1/(1+αi · t), relaxes the assumption
of constant instantaneous discount rates. However, the single model parameter α is difficult
to interpret because it reflects both, the change in the discount rate over time as well as the
average discount rate. Another popular model in economics is the hyperbolic discounting model
(Laibson, 1997): fQHi (t) = βi · δ ti , with fQHi (0) = 1. Here, βi represents the present bias of
consumers, allowing for lower discount factors after t = 1.
2.3 Identification and Estimation
Each respondent provides multiple choices for several price scenarios (i.e., choice tasks), lead-
ing to a panel structure of the data. Figure 1 shows an example of a price scenario as it was used
in the experiment. Each scenario (see the appendix for a summary of all price scenarios) is dif-
ferent and provides relevant information for estimating the models. DHJ show that the variation
in current and future market conditions is sufficient for the joint identification of the discounting
and utility functions. The simple intuition is that varying prices in this setup should not only
affect which brand is chosen but also when. A lower future price can, ceteris paribus, lead to
adoptions at a later period. On the other hand, a lower earlier price can, ceteris paribus, lead to
adoptions at an earlier period. We discuss this in greater detail when we present a model-free
analysis of the data in section 3.
Figure 1: Example Price Scenario
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The models are estimated using maximum simulated likelihood (Train, 2009). In case parame-
ters are bounded (e.g., δi ∈ (0,1)), we transform the corresponding parameters in θi accordingly
(e.g., logistic). 1,000 Halton draws are used in the estimation to approximate the integrals in
the likelihood function. We tested multiple starting values and checked the final Hessian at con-
vergence. Individual-level parameters are estimated via the “approximate Bayesian” approach
described in Train (2009, ch. 11).
3 Empirical Setup and Data Description
We created an online survey using Sawtooth that included the experimental price variation. As
mentioned earlier, we are interested in the adoption decision of portable Bluetooth speakers (see
figure 1). At the time of the data collection (June 2017), this product category was reasonably
new, but already popular, in particular, with younger consumers. We included the two most
prominent brands, UE (Megaboom) and JBL (Charge 2+), and explained to the respondents that
the prices are predictions of experts that they should interpret as given (i.e., without uncertainty).
In line with the real market (at that time), the prices of UE are higher than the prices of JBL.
Furthermore, as usual for consumer electronics, all future prices are decreasing, providing an
incentive to delay the adoption decision. Lastly, we included the next three years as future
periods and explained to the respondents that opting for the outside-good means that they will
not adopt any of the brands in the product category, also not in T > 3.
We collected data online and distributed a link to our survey to marketing students at Hum-
boldt University Berlin. We also asked the students to forward the link to friends and fam-
ily members. Each respondent in our sample was asked to make C = 18 adoption decisions
(structured in 3 blocks, see appendix) and also answer several additional questions about prod-
uct class experience, socio-demographics, and scales related to the cognitive process during
decision-making. 312 respondents completed all choice tasks. We further cleaned the data by
requiring that respondents 1) did not own a portable Bluetooth speaker, 2) completed the whole
questionnaire, and 3) needed more than 10 minutes (approx. 2.5% were faster than 10 minutes,
with a median time of 22.5 minutes) to complete the survey. This resulted in a final data set with
244 respondents with in total 4392 adoption choices. Of these respondents, 70.1% are females,
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77.1% are 30 years of age or younger, 93.5% are (bachelor or master) students, and 62.7% have
an income of less than 1500e. Our convenience sample consists, therefore, mainly of younger
people, that are well educated and have only a limited budget.
Table 1: Choice Shares Across All Price Scenarios
Brand June 2017 June 2018 June 2019 June 2020
UE Megaboom 5.6% 10.8% 14.3% 4.0%
JBL Charge 2+ 13.9% 17.3% 14.8% 10.3%
As a first check whether the data provides useful information for the dynamic discrete choice
model, we analyze the choices descriptively. Only 20.3% of the respondents made choices
for one brand and only 14.4% of the respondents adopted products at the same time. Hence,
we have a considerable amount of switching across brands and periods in the data. Table 1
summarizes the choice shares for all brands and periods across all choice tasks. We see that
while the shares for JBL are fairly similar across the 4 periods, adoptions for UE predominantly
take place in period 2 (i.e., June 2019). Also, the shares for JBL are higher than for UE. The
higher prices of UE can explain both observations. Lastly, the share for not adopting is 8.8%.
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Figure 2: First Intuition Regarding Forward-Looking Behavior
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Next, figure 2 shows the price scenarios (upper panel) and the corresponding choice shares with
95% CIs (lower panel). The second price scenario (“screen: 3”) only differs from the first one
by a lower price for JBL Charge 2+ in period 2; everything else stays the same. This price
change predominantly shifts the adoption choice share of JBL from periods 1 and 3 to period 2,
which is in line with the dynamic discrete choice model.
To further elaborate on whether respondents are forward-looking, we replicate the analysis
in DHJ and look at frequencies of outcomes for particular price scenarios. The price scenarios
were built such that in each scenario only one price for one brand is changed compared to a base
scenario (i.e., screen 1 in each of the 3 blocks, see appendix). Based on the particular choice
of a respondent in the base scenario, we can now classify whether in another price scenario the
price of the chosen brand was increased or decreased in an earlier, same, or future period.
Table 2: Model-Free Evidence of Forward-Looking Behavior
past price current price future price
decrease increase decrease increase decrease increase
n observations 375 153 208 251 559 89
no change 0.440 0.771 0.885 0.060 0.705 0.775
buy same brand earlier 0.389 0.000 0.014 0.016 0.000 0.000
buy same brand later 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.295 0.147 0.000
switch to other brand 0.136 0.163 0.087 0.478 0.111 0.135
switch to no purchase 0.013 0.059 0.005 0.133 0.016 0.011
correctly classified 0.829 0.771 0.885 1.000 0.852 0.775
total 0.862
Table 2 shows the results. Bold numbers indicate decisions that are consistent with forward-
looking behavior. For example, if someone picks a brand in period 1 and the price decreases
in a period after period 1 in one of the next screens, we should observe either no change or
switching to a later period (for the same brand). The opposite holds in case of a decrease in price
for an earlier period. Here we would expect respondents to adopt the same brand earlier (or no
change). On average, we see that 86.2% of the decisions of the respondents are consistent with
forward-looking behavior. This number matches well the results of the model-free evidence for
forward-looking behavior in DHJ.
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4 Results
We estimated four different discrete choice models with prices scaled in 100 Euros: 1) the
(static) mixed-logit model (MXL), 2) the dynamic MXL model with geometric discounting
(DMXLG), 3) the dynamic MXL model with hyperbolic discounting (DMXLH), and 4) the
dynamic MXL model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting (DMXLQH). Table 3 summarizes the
estimation results for these four models. In particular, we report the mean and the standard
deviation of the parameter distributions, as well as the log-likelihood values at the maximum
and the BIC.
Table 3: Estimation Results
Model:
MXL DMXLG DMXLH DMXLQH
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
γJBL 3.811 4.970 70.159 38.214 38.162 21.502 70.594 36.898
γUE 3.055 6.212 83.040 45.262 44.533 26.544 82.628 42.612
κ −0.949 3.923 −50.724 24.570 −22.999 12.335 −52.072 24.963
δ ∗ −0.418 1.154 −0.264 1.118
α∗∗ −0.171 1.389
β ∗ 10.163 5.124
LL −7272.851 −4739.681 −5821.667 −4734.945
BIC 14621.190 9596.788 11760.760 9637.641
Note: *logistic-normal; **log-normal; sd =
√
diag(Σ); all coef. significant at p< 0.01
All estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 1% level and all models show plau-
sible negative signs for the mean of the distribution of the price parameter. Furthermore, the
static MXL model does not fit the data well compared to the other, dynamic MXL models. This
is also evident from the low scale of the coefficients (compared to the other models) and the
relatively wide distribution of the price coefficient that covers positive values to some extent.
The DMXLG model fits considerably better than the DMXLH model and it has also a lower
BIC than the DMXLQH model. The DMXLQH still fits better than the model with geometric
discounting, but the distribution of the present-bias parameter β ∗ reveals an interesting special
case. The estimates are reported on the unconstrained space and because β is bound between 0
and 1, a mean of 10.163 for β ∗ indicates most of the distribution is concentrated very close to
1. The rather large sd of 5.124 also implies a very small fraction of consumers with a value for
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β very close to 0. Thus, the results do not really confirm a superior fit for the quasi-hyperbolic
model, but indicate that a mixture of consumers with geometric discounting and perfectly my-
opic consumers appears to be reasonable for the data at hand. Because the fraction of myopic
consumers is very small (about 0.1% with β < 0.01), we argue that the marginally better fit of
the DMXLQH is irrelevant and that the DMXLG is the best model. DHJ report similar findings,
even though their distribution for the present-bias parameter is less extreme.
4.1 Choice Model-Based Discount Factors
For the rest of our analysis we focus on results of the DMXLG model. Specifically, we now
discuss in greater detail the estimated discount factors at the individual level. Figure 3 shows the
histogram of the empirical distribution of δˆi. The distribution shows almost full support between
0 and 1 (the range is [0.05,0.9]), with a concentration around 0.4. Indeed, the mean of the
individual values is 0.43 and the standard deviation is 0.21. Thus, we find rather low discount
factors (even for the yearly time-intervals in our study) and a large amount of heterogeneity.
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Figure 3: Individual Discount Factors
The importance of heterogenous δ -values becomes also very clear when we look at restricted
DMXLG-models with fixed, and therefore, homogenous values for δ . Figure 4 depicts LL-
values of the fitted models. High and low values for δ lead to a much lower fit compared to the
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model with the estimated, heterogenous distribution of δ (dashed line), and even a model with
δ = 0.43 fits considerably worse.
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Figure 4: LL-Values for the DMXLG Model with Fixed Discount Factors
Thus, our application replicates the general results of DHJ: We find strong empirical evidence
that 1) consumers are forward-looking, 2) the estimated discount factors are considerably lower
than typical market interest rates would suggest, and 3) discount factors are very heterogeneous.
Lastly, we do not find compelling evidence for (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting of consumers.
4.2 Matching-Based Discount Factors
While our results are in line with the findings of DHJ, the rather low (average) values and
high heterogeneity of the estimated discount factors, as well as the weak empirical evidence for
present-bias might raise doubts regarding the validity of the results (and hence the particular
method for measuring time preferences). To better understand the results, we also included in
our questionnaire a second method for the elicitation of discount factors (see Frederick et al.,
2002 for an overview). In particular, we used matching tasks where respondents were told to
imagine they had won 200 Euros in a lottery and could take the money now or wait for one, two,
or three years and receive a larger amount (Thaler, 1981). The respondents were then asked to
equate each intertemporal option:
• e200 now = e______ in 1 year
• e200 now = e______ in 2 years
• e200 now = e______ in 3 years
10
The monetary value and the time frame match our setup for the adoption choice of Bluetooth
speakers. However, while the adoption tasks in the choice experiment provide a relevant context
and appear to be more realistic, an advantage of matching tasks is that they allow calculating
model-free estimates of discount factors for each respondent and period (Urminsky and Zauber-
man, 2016). The respondent- and period-specific discount factors follow from δit = 200/vit ,
where vit is the monetary value that respondent i wants for waiting t years instead of taking the
200 Euros now. Aggregating over respondents yield mean estimates of δ¯1 = 0.72, δ¯2 = 0.56,
and δ¯3 = 0.45. While these values look like geometric discounting would also be a reasonable
model for discount factors from matching tasks, we estimated all discount functions from sec-
tion 2.2 with respondent- and period-specific discount factors as the dependent variable using
nonlinear least squares.1
• Geometric: fG(t) = 0.754t (Resid. error = 0.215, BIC = -162.962).
• Hyperbolic: fH(t) = 1/(1+0.325 · t) (Resid. error = 0.214, BIC = -171.3105).
• Quasi-hyperbolic: fQH(t) = 0.911 ·0.790t (Resid. error = 0.214, BIC = -164.830).
All estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, based on
matching tasks, the models with (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting outperform the model geomet-
ric discounting (i.e., have a lower BIC). However, the fit is only marginally better. Given that
our primary motivation for computing matching-based discount factors is the comparison with
the model-based discount factors from the previous section, we decide to continue our analy-
sis using the geometric model. Specifically, we compute respondent-specific estimates for the
discount factors using the geometric mean: δˆi = 3
√
δi1 ·
√
δi2 · 3
√
δi3.
Figure 5 shows the histogram of δˆi in the sample. The distribution is now more skewed
towards the upper bound, with a mean of 0.73 and a range between 0.25 and 0.99. These results
are very similar to findings reported in the literature (see, e.g., Frederick et al., 2002).
4.3 Comparison
Next, we want to compare the results from both methods (i.e., choice model vs. matching tasks).
While it was already clear from the previous analyses that the distributions for the discount
1We refrain from using hierarchical models because we only have three observations per respondent.
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Figure 5: Individual Discount Factors (Matching-Based)
factors somewhat differ, both methods still might lead to similar insights at the respondent-level
if discount factors across both methods (but within respondents) are correlated.
Before computing and testing the Pearson correlation, we logit-transform the discount fac-
tors: λˆik = ln(δˆik/(1− δˆik)), with k ∈ {C,M} indicating the two methods (choice model and
matching). Correlating δ instead of λ could bias the result towards zero because δ is bounded
between 0 and 1. Furthermore, also the potentially large measurement errors of the discount
factors at the individual-level can lead to an attenuation of the correlation.2 To deal with this
issue we employed the correction method of Spearman (1904), where the corrected correlation
is ρ = corr(λˆC,λˆM)√
(RλC ·RλM )
. Here the numerator is the Pearson correlation without correction and Rλk is
the reliability coefficient of λk. We used the average of the standard errors in both methods to
compute these reliability coefficients.
Figure 6 (Panel: A) shows the scatterplot between the transformed discount factors of both
methods. We see a positive but not overly strong relationship between both methods. The
corrected correlation is 0.195 and hence only small/medium in magnitude. Nevertheless, the
value is significant (95% CI [0.053, 0.330]) and hence the results from the choice model are
2We computed standard errors for the discount factors using the conditional variance in case of the choice model
(see Greene 2012, p. 644) or the simple formula (see, e.g., Harding et al. 2014) in the case of matching. We used
the delta method to obtain standard errors for λ .
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validated using a different, established method. Panel: B of figure 6 also shows a Bland-Altman
plot, where the differences in ∆λ = λˆC− λˆM are plotted against λˆC+λˆM2 . A correlation does not
necessarily imply an agreement between measures and the graph again shows, that matching-
based discount factors are larger on average (i.e., ∆λ < 0). However, the graph further clarifies
that this difference is not affected by the average values; thus, the level of (dis-) agreement is
stable.
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Figure 6: Comparison of Individual Discount Factors
Lastly, to explore whether there are relationships between the level of discounting and observed
heterogeneity of the respondents, we regress λˆC and λˆM on demographic variables, the survey
duration, and the score of the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005). However, we used the
5-item version proposed by Böckenholt (2012). We fitted the linear models using WLS with the
inverse of the squared standard errors of the λik values as weights.
Table 4 summarizes the regression results with several interesting differences between the
discount factors obtained from both methods. In the choice model, higher income is associated
with a lower level of patience, which makes intuitive sense. Most other variables, in particular,
the ones that might serve as an indicator for more deliberate and rational decision making, do
not affect the discount factors. Interestingly, respondents with longer survey durations have
lower discount factors, which indicates that low(er) discount factors are not necessarily a result
of low attention during the choice experiment. Matching-based discount factors, on the other
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hand, are indeed positively affected by higher scores of the cognitive reflection test, as in Fred-
erick (2005), or a higher level of education. These respondents might interpret this method of
elicitation as a test, and try to give answers that imply more “reasonable” discount factors. As
before, longer survey durations are also related to lower discount factors. For matching-based
discount factors, income has no significant effect. In both cases, the R2-values of about 0.11
and 0.12 indicate that the variables explain only some variance in the (transformed) discount
factors.
Table 4: Drivers of discount factors
Dependent Variable:
λC λM
intercept 0.930* (0.329) 1.616* (0.267)
income (>1000 Euro) −0.445* (0.128) 0.164 (0.134)
gender (male) −0.132 (0.135) 0.197 (0.132)
age (26 and older) 0.134 (0.132) −0.381* (0.143)
edu (BSc or higher) −0.121 (0.110) 0.420* (0.136)
log(duration) −0.240* (0.098) −0.183* (0.071)
CRT score 0.008 (0.047) 0.100* (0.050)
R2 0.118 0.114
Note: WLS estimates and standard errors in parentheses; * p< 0.05
5 Summary and Conclusion
Our results show that consumers are forward-looking. Dynamic models fit the adoption choice
data better than static models and models, assuming myopic consumers. Also, the model-free
within-subject analysis provides evidence for forward-looking behavior. The discount factors
are considerably lower than typical market interest rates would imply (≈ 0.43), and we do not
find compelling evidence for hyperbolic discounting (based on the adoption choices). These
results are in agreement with the findings from DHJ. In addition, we find that the discount fac-
tors obtained from matching tasks (for the same respondents) are considerably higher (≈ 0.73),
and mild indications of hyperbolic discounting are present. The correlation of discount factors
between both methods is positive and significant, but the magnitude is relatively small. Re-
gression analyses reveal that different variables are related to discount factors in both methods.
Higher income affects discount factors in adoption choices negatively, whereas a higher level of
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education or higher scores in the cognitive reflection test only affect matching-based discount
factor positively. This explains to some degree why the correlation between discount factors
between both methods is not higher.
The study has several limitations. The adoption choices and the answers in the matching-
tasks were not incentivized. Hence, the rather low values of the choice model-based discount
factors and the differences across methods might be due to a hypothetical bias. There is a
rich literature on mechanisms for incentive-aligned choice-based conjoint analysis (e.g., Ding,
2007), but it is unclear how to adapt these methods such that they would work in the context of
adoption choices. Future research should, therefore, analyze the approach of DHJ with conse-
quential adoption choices. Furthermore, we only used a convenience sample that mainly con-
sisted of students. Hence, variation in many relevant demographic variables that are related to
time-preferences was limited. Future research should focus on representative samples. Lastly,
in DHJ and our study, the empirical evidence of present-biased consumers was weak. Future
research should further investigate whether this is a generalizable result for adoption decisions
or whether there are particular features of the experimental design that lead to this outcome.
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Figure 7: Manipulated Price Time-Series in the Experiment
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